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Summary findings
A number of studies have examined the effects of secure  increased if the household population increases, and how
tenure on agricultural investment and productivity.  frequent average land adjustments are under the
Carter and Yao also study the importance of rights to  household responsibility system.
household residual income and land use being  Analyzing panel data for a sample of farm households,
transferable.  Carter and Yao study the "investment regret mitigation
Contemporary  China - where industrialization has  effect," which results when greater transfer rights make
spread rapidly, if unevenly - is a good place to study the  households more willing to invest because they are less
economic effects of transfer rights as well as  likely to regret such investments when they can recoup
conventional security of tenure. Village collectives  the investment value even if they exit farming.
formally own land in China, so there can be no  Carter and Yao find that transfer rights may be
individual land sales, but farmers are sometimes entitled  especially important  in an industrializing economy. A
to sell their rights to use the land allocated to them under  property rights system with incomplete security of tenure
the household responsibility system.  but with strong transfer rights that permit "specialization
Whether a household has secure tenure depends on  without regret" - so farmers can recoup the value of an
whether its landholding will be reduced if the household  investment even if they exit farming - may have much
population declines, whether  the landholding will be  to recommend it.
This paper - a product of Rural Development, Developnment  Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to
study the determinants and impact of property rights systems  and land tenure regimes in the process of development. Copies
of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Maria
Fernandez, room MC3 -542, telephone 202-473-3766, fax 202-522-1151, Internet address mfernandez2@ worldbank.org.
Policy Research Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http:!/wTww.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/
Workpapers/home.html.  The authors may be contacted at carter@caae.wisc.edu  or yyao@ccer.pku.edu.cn. October 1999.
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Among those mutable factors that constrain economic  performnance  in low income and
transitional economies, property rights over land rank high by most calculations.'  With a few
important exceptions, the literature that has tried to quantify the economic effects of property
rights has concentrated on the security with which individuals hold rights over land.  The goal
of this paper is to broaden the focus of these earlier efforts to include transfer rights, meaning
an individual's liberty to rent or sell the use, income and other rights that he or she holds.
Theoretically  this paper shows that transfer rights permit specialization  in off-farm activities
economy industrializes and its population begins to specialize in non-agricultural activities.
Transfer rights should also facilitate (shadow) factor price equalization across households and
resolve problems of allocative inefficiency  that are likely to become more severe under the
pressure of industrialization. This paper's econometric analysis of household level panel data
from China largely corroborates these theoretical propositions concerning transfer rights.
With its finding that transfer rights seem to matter more than tenure security,  the empirical
analysis also suggests some novel directions for future property rights reform in China.
The liberalization of transfer rights has emerged as a contested and yet poorly
understood policy issue in a number of countries, both in those where land is or until recently
has been held under customary tenure arrangements,  and in those where earlier redistributive
reforms reshaped land ownership structure. This paper considers transfer rights in the context
I  See  for example  the discussion  in Alston,  Libecap  and Schneider  (1996) and the many references  contained
therein.
1of China and its particular history of reforms that generated a highly egalitarian distribution of
land. 2 China's household responsibility  system reform of the late 1970s and early 1980s
replaced collective  production teams with household-based  production units, and assigned use
and residual income rights to individual  households. Transfer rights and tenure security  were
not fixed nationally at the time of these reforms, and they have been subject to local
determination  and subsequent evolution (Liu et al. 1998).
A number of analysts have credited the hybrid property rights system created by the
household responsibility system reforms for the rapid and sustained agricultural growth that
took place in China in the early 1980s. While the exact weight of the reform in this growth
spell can be disputed, 3 there is little doubt that the reforms unambiguously sharpened
individual  work incentives. Moreover, for an economy that was labor intensive and where
most rural people worked full-time in agriculture,  the reforms should also have attained
approximate allocative efficiency without any factor market transactions given that land was
allocated to families in rough proportion to their labor endowments (Burgess 1998). The
limited transfer rights and weak tenure security that emerged in many areas may have been
relatively unimportant  in the initial post-reform period.
However, the subsequent and rapid growth in industrial employment and wages has
undercut the conditions that may have rendered transfer rights unimportant. 4 With the
2 Liberalization of transfer rights could be argued to work differently in less egalitarian economies (e.g.,
Mexcio or Nicaragua) because large wealth differentials create potentially radically different patterns of capital
access that spill over and influence the function of the land market (eg.,  see Carter and Salgado,
forthcoming).
3 Lin (1992) and  MacMillian, Whalley, and Zhu (1989) argue that the property rights reform was central,
while Putterman (1992) warns that their analysis overstates the importance of property rights reform relative
to price reform.
4 Carter and Yao (1998) for exanple  show that land-labor endowment distribution has become more disperse
over time.
2slowdown in agricultural growth after mid-1980s, the wisdom of the hybrid, village-based
land tenure system has come under both academic and policy scrutiny. Some argue that
restricted transfer rights and frequent insecurity-inducing  land redistribution and small
landholdings  rooted in the village-based  land tenure system have become the major hindrance
to the improvement of agricultural productivity. Others argue that whatever its costs, the
current land tenure system provides important benefits by functioning as a mechanism of rural
social insurance (Dong, 1996 and Kung 1994).
While the work presented here does not address the social insurance benefits of the
current system, it does try to identify the more narrowly construed investment and
productivity benefits that might attend a further liberalization of property rights.  To this end,
Section 1 below develops a two period model that identifies three kinds of effects that further
property rights reform in China may have:
1.  A Security-Induced Investment Demand Effect that results when households perceive a
reduction in the likelihood  that land in which they might sink, attached, long-lived
investment will be reallocated  to other households 5;
2.  An Investment Regret Mitigation Effect, that results when greater transfer rights make
households more willing to make investments because they are less likely to regret sinking
investment in the land because they become able to recoup the value of the investment
even if they should exit farming.
3.  A Factor Price Equalization Effect that results when increased transfer rights facilitate the
equalization  of returns to land, labor and short-lived capital between household farming
units.
The first of these three effects has been studied extensively  in the literature (see the summary
5We  omit  the collateral  effect  because  land is not allowed  to be used as loan collateral  in current  China.
Besides,  using  land as a collateral  is a doubtful  punishment  for loan default  in an economy  where  land per
capita  ranges  from only  one thirtieth  to one  tenth of a hectare,  as our survey  revealed  (Table 1).
3by Feder and Akihiko, 1996).6 Distinguishing  it from the latter two effects, which result from
liberalized  transfer rights, faces a number of challenges,  including the fact that transfer rights
and tenure security often move together.  Fortunately,  the theory developed in Section 1
below suggests a number of quite specific tests that permit us to distinguish security from
regret and factor price equalization effects. Many of these tests are variations on what have
become known as separabilty  tests that ask whether shadow prices and factor choices in
production independent of household endowments and consumption choices. Interestingly,
the modeling done here suggest that much conventional  separability testing has been mis-
specified in the sense that non-separability,  if it holds at all, applies differently across different
market participation regimes and that a single regression model that pools observations across
regimes is inappropriate.
Section 2 develops an econometric implementation  of the theoretical model. While
offering a powerful, if statistically conservative,  control for latent variables, the panel data
methods put forward force reliance upon simulated maximum likelihood (SML) methods
given multiple land market participation  regimes and the presence of censoring in the
investment  data. Using data collected in 1988 and 1993 on.  a sample of 400 rice-producing
households spread across 40 villages in 2 Chinese provinces, Section 3 then presents the SML
results.  While the models and methods demand a lot of the data, both investment regret and
factor price equalizations effects prove significant. Interestingly,  the tenure security effects
6 For China,  recent studies  by Rozelle,  Li and Brandt  (1998),  Carter  and Yao (1998),  and Jacoby  Li, and
Rozelle  (1998)  find  some evidence  of tenure  security  effects,  standing  in contrast  to the earlier  study  by Feder,
Lau,  Lin, and Luo  (1992)  who found  that  the link between  fanners' perception  of tenure  security  and farm
investment  was very  weak if positive  at all. The investment  regret  effect  is similar  to what Besley  identifies  as
the tenns of trade  effect,  while  the factor  price equalization  effect  has parallels  to Gavian  and Fafchamps
(1996)  tests  of allocative  inefficiency.
4appear insignificant. As discussed  in the concluding Section 4, these results provide insights
into promising directions for further property rights reform.
Section 1  A Model of the Impact of Tenure Security and Transfer Rights on Allocative
Efficiency and Investment Incentives
This section develops a two period model that identifies  the avenues through which
transfer rights and tenure security affect agricultural productivity and investment. Constrained
by the degree of tenure security and land transfer rights that they hold, households in the first
period make investment decisions and allocate variable factors of production between on- and
off-farm uses, taking into account the expected impact of these decisions on their future
wellbeing. Prior to the second period, two village-level shocks are realized, a land
redistribution shock and an off-farm employment growth shock. Households then allocate
variable factors of production for second period production. In order to highlight the factor
price equalization effect of land transfer rights, this section first analyzes this model for the
special case in which there is no prospect that off-farm TVE employment  will expand in the
second period. We then consider the more general case of employment growth shocks and
show the additional impacts generated  by the resulting investment regret effect.
1.1 The Model
Households enjoy endowments of labor time, L,  and contract land, IC.  The exact
bundle of rights held over contract land is variable and is detailed below.  Each period,
households divide their endowment of family labor between on-farm agricultural uses (Lf,
home or sideline enterprises (L'), and wage employment in township and village enterprises
5(L).  Income in these activities is generated as follows:
Ai  F(K, Tf , Lf )
g(Ls);  and,
wLw,
where A, is a household-specific  technical efficiency (or agricultural comparative advantage)
term, K is capital, Tf  is farmed or operated land F is a conventional constant returns to scale
production function with positive cross partials (e.g., FLK >0).7 We assume that returns to
labor allocated to sideline diminish (g' >0, g"< 0), and that the TVE wages exceed the
marginal agricultural labor product (Yao 1998) such that the time allocated by a household to
these activities is bound by the constraint Lw < Law
Capital in the agricultural production function is long-lived, and attached to the land.
Examples of such capital include terraces, fencing, and fertile soil.  In first period, there is no
inherited capital stock, and all capital is purchased by a price of rK,  and capital goods are
spread out evenly across a farm's cultivated area (both own and rented land). To sidestep
issues concerning investment disincentives  on rented land, we assume that landlords pay a per-
mu rebate of kjvk , where k1 is the installed capital stock per-mu, and vk is the rebate rate that
7 Because  in our particular  empirical  application,  households'  endowments  of productive  resources  are small
enough  that labor  hiring is trivial (except  for peak season  agricultural  tasks), we ignore  hired  labor, effectively
assuming  that households  are optimally  in the regime  where no labor hiring is desirable. Generalizing  the
model to consider  hired labor could take one of two directions. The first would be to assume that labor
effort-measured in efficiency  units-can  simply be hired at a fixed agricultural  wage rate.  A second,  and
more realistic approach, would be to  assume that households  face what Bowles (1985) calls a  "labor
extraction"  problem, meaning  that without  supervision  or other incentives,  hired laborers supply very little
efficiency  labor per-unit time.  Under the latter specification,  the model changes little if supervisory  costs
increase  with farm  size as the equilibrium  shadow  wage will increase  with  farm size,  as in the present  model.
6that individuals expect to equal to their expected marginal second period use value of capital. 8
Households hold full current use and residual income rights to their contract land
endowment. There are, however, two other important dimensions of the property rights to
contract land. First, as discussed above, in some areas of rural China, households may not
rent-out their land, while in other areas land renting is allowed subject to various conditions
that range from shifting the incidence of the land tax and other collective duties, to obtaining
the acquiescence and approval of local authorities. In still other areas, land may be freely
rented with no restrictions or regulation (see Liu et al., 1998). The severity of restrictions on
private transfers of land rights, M, is defined such that higher values indicate less encumbered
(more freely transferable) land rights. We assume that the restrictions on land transactions
create a per-mu cost, co(M) (with co' <O)  for those that rent-out land; and, c(AM)  (with c" <0)
for those that rent-in. 9 The net returns from renting out R° units of land are thus R°(r' - co
(A)), while the total cost of renting in R' units of land is R' (r' + c' (M)).  We assume that
second period transfer rights, M2, are given by:
M2  = MI  +
where p is a random variable with a mean of zero so that institutional expectations are
regressive in the sense that E(M 2) = Ml.
In addition to limited land transfer rights, households may confront a degree of tenure
insecurity. In contemporary China, tenure insecurity results from the probability that village
authorities  will reallocate land among villagers based on changes in household labor force
composition, consumption needs, or other considerations. The willingness of village
8 A more  realistic  portrayal  might  specify  the rebate  rate  to be the outcome  of a bargaining  process  between
landlord  and tenant  and hence  to be between  the use values  of capital  for these  two agents.
7authorities to reallocate land and the resulting degree of tenure insecurity varies across rural
China (see Liu et al., 1998 and Kung, 1994). We assume that when a redistribution shock
occurs, all land in the village is redistributed and that a household has zero probability of
retaining any of its prior allocation of contract and rental land. Denote the probability that a
reallocation shock occurs as q(S), where S is the level of tenure security (or immunity from
redistribution)  defined such that q'(S) < 0.
Given this structure of opportunities and rights, we assume that conditional on optimal
second period behavior households make first period choices in order to:
Max  AiF(KI, Tlf , Lf ) + w￿L  + g(L]4)  - ritKI -
Llf  , LS,,  R'(r'  +c'(M,))+R 0 (rlt -c 0 (M,))+PE[ir;(..)]
R ,R%KIA
sI.
(1)  Lf +Ls 'L-Li
Rio <Tc
T, =Tc  +R,'  -R°
L,f  , L,s,  RI`, Rio > 0
where ir2 is the optimum value function corresponding  to the second period problem
(detailed in Appendix 1) and 1B  is the discount factor. Ignoring the trivially slack inequality
restrictions on labor and land rental, this model yields the following first order conditions:
Aft  - c  = 0
Afk  -r  + X2k  = 0
(2)  - Af  +  (r<'  - co (M,))  < O, R°  a7r  = O
Af-(r 1 +c'(M,))<0;  RI  I  =O
9  For those that rent land out, these costs can be thought of as political retribution costs.  For those that rent-in,
8where the assumption of constant returns to scale has been used to rewrite the first order
conditions in terms of agricultural labor and capital intensity per-unit land (E and k) andf(e,k),
average output per unit of land. The term x5  - g'(L - (Li  + Lf )) is the endogenous shadow
price of labor, and  rk  , (DE72  /aKj) = ,B  (1- q) an  /aKI  is the endogenous expected
second period shadow value of first period investment. Appendix 1 shows that under mild
assumptions, this latter term reduces to:
(3)  F2'  (I  ,(-q)A  t*2,  2k2)
where e 2 and k2  are optimal second period factor intensities in agricultural production.
The first period maximization problem admits three distinct land rental regimes: one
where land is rented in (RI' > O;  R1
0 = 0);  one where land is rented out (RI'=  0; RI 0> 0);
and, a double corner solution or autarchy regime where no rental transactions take place.
Households  in the autarchy regime will, by definition set T  r4-  7c and in autarchic equilibrium
the dual corner solution condition must hold:
(4)  (rll _Co  (Ml))  < Af(e  A ,kA)  )<(rl'  + Cl (MI)),
where £~1  and k,  denote the optimal autarchy factor intensities. Note that households will
be found in the autarchy regime because of the price wedge between net price for renting-in
versus renting-out land.
1.2 Security-Induced Investment Demand Effect
Tenure security influences labor and investment intensities through its impact on the
shadow price of the first period investment in the second period production. From (3), it is
easy to see that the shadow value  ef  of investment  is increasing in tenure security,  S, as will
they can be thought of the search costs that occur when legal uncertainties render markets thin.
9be first period investment intensity k,*. Under the assumption stated above that FLK> 0,
optimal labor intensity per-unit land will also increase with tenure security,  S. In contrast to
the affects associated with land transfer rights to be analyzed in the next sections, this
conventional investment  demand tenure security effect holds for all households irrespective  of
land rental regime.
1.3 Factor Equalization Effect of Land Transfer Rights
To derive the factor price equalization effects summarized in Table 1, first consider the
behavior of the endogenous shadow factor prices within each land rental regime. As shown in
the appendix, for households in the autarchy regime:
(5)  dc A*/aTc  > 0; a&</AL-  <0  ; and a&5*/laMl  =  0.
Optimal  labor intensity, X,*, moves in the opposite direction of the shadow price of labor
(e.g.,  &A*/  aTc  < 0; ).  Labor intensity by households in the autarchy regime thus varies with
household land endowment. Intuitively,  this "non-  to results because following an
increase in its contract land endowment, a household would begin to reallocate labor from
competing  use in sideline activities (g(.)) toward agricultural production. However, as it did
so, the shadow price of labor would rise, and the optimal labor intensity of agricultural
production would fall. 1'  In addition, for households in the autarchy regime, a larger
endowment means that the future use value of investment  will be lower as a higher shadow
10  Strictly  speaking,  the term non-separability  refers  to models  in which  the consumption  choices  of a joint
production/consumption  unit are inseparable  from  production  choices. However,  as in the present  model,  such
standard  non-separability  creates  a relationship  between  factor  choice  and wealth,  and  results  from the same
market  incompleteness  that drive  results  in our  model  under  autarchy.
11  Note that if investment  activities  require  labor,  this same  effect  also  increases  the direct  (labor)  costs  of
investment
10value of labor means that the investment  will be exploited  less intensively. The second period
shadow value of first period investment  thus also decreases with land endowment:
ak  /aTc  < 0, and desired capital intensity would diminish with it. Shadow factor prices are
not equalized across households within this regime as both the shadow wage and the second
period shadow value of investment change with endowments.
In contrast to behavior within the autarchy regime, the resource allocation by
households in the rent-in and rent-out regimes is separable from endowments and is forrnally
identical to what would happen in case of perfect rental markets (with the exception of course
that there is a transaction costs wedge between the rental rates faced by households that rent-
in land versus those that rent-out). In this case, factor intensities become independent of
household endowments of land and labor: a&5"1aTc,afA  laTc  = 0.  Appendix 1 further
shows that freer land transfer rights dimninish  the wedge between net rental rates, and that,
with some qualifications:
(7)  af  l7aMi  < O, a/*MlaM 1 > 0,
where tfl  and e°  are the labor intensities of the rent-in and rent-out regimes, respectively.
Again, qualitatively  identical results can be obtained for capital choice.  Intuitively,  households
exploit the comparative advantage created by their relative endowments by using the land
rental market to adjust the size of their operated holdings. Within, but not between, each of
these regimes, shadow factor prices (&O  and F2k  ) are equalized. Note that shadow prices and
optimal factor intensities within each regime are functions of transaction costs and transfer
restrictions, and that as these diminish,  the factor intensity in the rent-in regimes shrink, while
those in the rent-out regime increase, moving the shadow  prices and factor intensities in the
11two regimes closer together.
We are now in a position to see the threshold and full factor price equalization effects
of land transfer rights.  In the autarchy regime, as contract land endowment r'  increases, land
productivity decreases. For a given level land transfer rights, Ml, and transaction costs,
co(MI), there will occur a critical or threshold endowment value, T°,  beyond which
households will optimally rent-out positive amounts of land. Symmetrically,  given Ml and
c'(MI,  as contract land endowment shrinks, factor intensities rise and there will occur a
critical land endowment level, T ',  below which households will violate the corner solution
condition in (4) and rent-in positive amounts of land. As land transfer rights increase and
transaction costs decrease, the rental threshold points squeeze together
(i.e., aTf'I/M,  >  0;  at,°  /aM1 < 0)  and the land endowment range over which households
will optimally  behave in an autarchic fashion decreases.
Figure 1 graphically  portrays and summarizes the the factor price equalization effects
of land transfer rights.  The solid lines show the relationship  between shadow prices and land
endowments for a modest level of land transfer rights, Ml'.  As transfer rights become less
encumbered (more freely marketable) and move to some M1
2 > Ml,  the shadow price
relationships shift as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 1. Note that the two flat segments
for the rent-in and rent-out regimes squeeze together, and that the endowment range over
which households behave autarchically  diminishes as the threshold values, T°  and T'
squeeze together. Transfer rights do not, however, effect the degree of non-separability  for
households in the autarchy regime. In the limiting case of complete transfer rights and zero
transactions costs, shadow factor prices would be equalized across all households, and the
12relationship would reduce to the case of complete separability  as shown by the horizontal
dotted line shown in Figure 1. Note that short of this case, the sorts of global test of
separability found in the literature that do not distinguish  between rental regimes (e.g.,
Benjamin, 1992) would be mis-specified and subject to a degree of bias dependent on the
distribution of households across the three regimes.
1.4 Uncertain  Of-Farm Employment Growth and the Investment Regret Effect
The analysis so far has assumed that the second period TVE job ration does not
change. Suppose instead that second period TVE employment is given by:
=w  -w
(9)  L2  =Li  +0,
where 0 is a random shock that is realized at the outset of the second period and is distributed
in the non-negative  interval [0,01 and has a probability  density function O(0  1  4). In addition,
we assume that this shock is independent  of the land redistribution shock discussed earlier.
The conditioning  parameter, 4, is used to generate shifts in the density function, with higher
values of 4 indicating improved TVE employment  prospects in a village. In particular, we rely
on the notion of first order stochastic dominance and assume that DOc(0  I  4)/DX < 0,VO,
where P is simply  the cumulative density fumction  corresponding  to 4.
For a household that optimally rents-in land during the first period, there is some
chance that employment growth will be sufficiently  strong that the household will cease to
rent in land and enter the autarchy regime in the second period.' 2 Denote the household's
12 In theory,  a sufficiently  large  shock  could move  a household  all the way from the rent-in  regime  to the rent-
out regime. However  we ignore  this case which  in any case  adds mathematical  complexity  without  changing
the qualitative  character  of the results.
13second period autarchy marginal product of land as:
(10)  Fr  (2(0,T  c), k2
Because an increase in 0 operates like a decrease in household labor endowment, it is easy to
see that (10) decreases monotonically in 0.  There is a critical value of 0, 0 ',  such that a
household will stay in rent-in regime when 0 is less than 0',  and will switch to autarky when
the opposite is true. To keep matters simple, we will assume that there is no probability that
the shock will be so large that a household would move all the way from the rent-in to the
rent-out regime.
As can be seen from the second period problem that is detailed in Appendix 1, 0  is
determined implicitly  by the following  equation
(11)  F(E  2(0I,Tc),k 2)  =  r 2 + CI (M2) +  vkk2
Using the implicit function theorem, it is straightforward  to establish that:
(12)  adC <'  a5M  >°
These two results are intuitive as it takes a smaller employment growth shock to send a
household with a large land endowment from renting into autarky, and a less restrictive land
transfer rights keep households renting-in land longer even as their notional demand for land
becomes quite small.
In the presence of employment growth shocks, the expected second period shadow
value of first period investment (equation 3 above) can be rewritten for househlds in the first
period rent-in regime as:
(13)  Ff"  =  f3(1-q)[f  F(e'k 2)W(0 I0)de  +2  2FK  (LX(Q,Tc),k 2)*(0  1  O)dol
14where the first integral term is the expected second period value of investment assuming the
employment shock is small enough that the household remains in the rent-in regime in period
2, while the second term is the expected value of investment if the shock is large enough to
shift the household into the autarchy regime.
As detailed in Appendix 1, analysis of expression (13) reveals that when there is a
positive probability  of a regime shift (O'  < 0 ):
DF2k" a  T  c,  Dr2'k'l/D4<  0.
In other words, the prospect for future specialization  in off-farm employment is accompanied
by an investment regret effect that depresses current on-farm investment below what it would
be in the absence of such future prospects. Moreover, these regret effects are stronger the
better are these future prospects (as measured by 4).
Intuitively,  these results can be explained as follows. For a household that in period I
is in the rent-in regime, a sufficiently  large increase in remunerative off-farm wage
employment will move the household into second period autarchy. As analyzed earlier, an
autarchic household is one that finds it unprofitable to incrementally adjust its cultivated area
in the land rental because of transactions costs.' 3 Consequently,  the household's second
period shadow price of labor will increase and the resulting decline in second period labor
intensity reduces the second period returns to investment  to a level below that which the
household would have achieved had it remained a "cheap labor," rent-in household. Any
investments that would be made based on the presumption of a abundant family labor in the
second period would in fact be regretted in the wake of strong off-farm employment growth
13 Note also that investment is attached to the land so that it cannot be rented out or sold independently of a
land market transaction.
15that reduced the returns to such investment. The magnitude of these regret effects increase
with the probability of a regime shift (i.  e., larger r or higher4) and its attendant increasing
labor to land scarcity.
These primary regret effects for households in the first period rent-in regime are
mitigated by liberalized  transfer rights:
adF
2 kI/  IT TC  M,  > O;  and,
a '2 kl l aaaMl,  >o,
(see Appendix 1 for details).  Intuitively,  transfer rights dampen the regret effects associated
with off-farm employment growth because they reduce transactions costs, increase 6  , and
make it less likely that a household will fall into autarchy and experience  increasing labor
scarcity and depressed investment returns.
Households that are optimally in first period autarchy are also subject to investment
regret effects. For these households, here is a critical employment shock value, H  °,  such that
a household will stay in autarchy when 0 is less than OP, and will switch to the rent-out
regime when the opposite is true. This critical value can be defined by the appropriate
analogue to equation (11) above and Appendix 1 shows that:
(14)  ~~~~~~~aboo  a6Oo
(14)  aTC  'aM 2
For this first period autarchy case, the expected second period value of first period investment
is:
(15)  72k' = fl(lq)[  F-  q  (.0,Tc),k 2 *)+0;a)dO +JUO  FA(t  , k2)0(0;a)dO]
16where the first integral term captures the expected value of investment for those shocks that
keep the household in autarchy, while the second term is the expected value for those shocks
that render household labor so scarce that the household rents-out land. As before, the
magnitude of the regret effect increases with F' and 4:
amr ID  Tc,  ar-2kA4  ID  < 0,
as increases in both of these factors make it more likely that the household will experience
lower returns to installed capital in the second period. Derivation of 0 is again given in the
Appendix 1.
As for households in first period rent-in regime, the magnitude of these regret effects
are again mitigated by improved transfer rights:
D22l/T'aM,arvaaM,  o,
as shown in the appendix. An important  implication of these investment  regret mitigation
effects is that they imply that shadow  prices and factor choices within the autarchy regime are
sensitive to transfer rights.  Recall that as detailed in section 2.3, in the absence of
employment shocks, transfer rights have no effect on behavior within the autarchy regime.' 4
For households that optimally rent-out land in the first period, there is no investment
regret effect. Since these households are already beyond the rent-out threshold, strong
growth in off-farm employment  will simply lead them to marginally  rent-out additional  land.
By so doing they will receive compensation  for investment  they made that is identical to their
14 However, there is no simple, ceterius paribus effect of transfer rights on F2  . As detailed in the appendix,
the direct effect of transfer rights on r2kA  may be negative for households with relatively small land
endowment or when  , is low, though it is unambiguously positive when these values are large enough.
17marginal use value of the capital goods would have been.' 5 The expected second period
shadow value of investment for these households is thus independent of 4 and these
households can specialize without regret.
Figure 2 shows the impact of the investment  regret effect on factor intensity. The solid
curve displays the predicted relationship  between factor intensity and contract land
endowment when there is no chance of growth in second period off-farm employment. With a
shift toward a positive probability of growth in second period off-farm employment,  the
relationship shifts toward that shown by the dashed line. As can be seen, the investment
regret effect now creates a non-sepearability  between factor choice and endowments for
households in the rent-in regime.  The size of this regret effect and its depressing effect on
investment, increases with land endowment for households in this regirne. For households in
first period autarchy,  the regret effect depresses investment, though the effect becomes muted
for households with larger land endowments. Households that rent-out land in the first period
are unaffected by the investment regret effect. Finally,  holding the probability structure
constant, the dotted line shows the effect of more marketable property rights on the
investrnent  regret effect and desired investment and labor intensity. As property rights
becomes more marketable and shift from Ml' to M,2, the relationship between land
endowment and factor intensity rotates and flattens out as shown by the dotted line in Figure
1.5 Summary of Testable  Hypotheses
As a prelude to the econometric analysis, Table 1 summarizes the various property rights
15 Note that had we assumed that the tied investment rental rate, vk, exceeded the use value of those who rent-
out land, we would have found that an increase in off-farm employment prospects would have increased the
second period shadow value of investment for households in the rent-out regime.
18effects derived in this section. In addition to the standard tenure security effect, transfer rights
affect allocative  efficiency and investment  incentives. If the prospects for future off-farm
employment  growth are negligible, then the model hypothesizes
1  . Non-separable (endowment dependent) factor proportions and transfer rights
independence  for households autarchy;
2.  Separable factor proportions and transfer rights dependence for households in the rent-
in and rent-out regimes; and,
3.  Transfer rights threshold effects that shrink the band of autarchy;.
When off-farm employment prospects grow probabilistically,  there are three additional
implications:
4.  Investment for autarchic household becomes transfer right dependent;
5.  Factor proportions become non-separable for households in the rent-in regime; and,
6.  For households in both the autarchy and rent-in regime, transfer rights mitigate the
intensity of the investment regret effect.
Tests for implications 4-6 will be key to distinguishing  between factor price equalization  and
investment regret effects.
Section 2  Simulated Maximum Likelihood Methods to Estimate Property Rights
Effects using Panel Data
This section develops the econometric model and estimation technique that will be
used to test the theoretical hypotheses derived in the prior section. Panel data methods are a
key component of the identification  strategy and will be used to control for latent individual
and village-level factors that would otherwise confound efforts to identify the impact of
property rights on investment and productivity. By effectively controlling  for systematic
differences  between villages and individuals, these methods rely on variation in household
19behavior over time to identify the impact that property rights have on investment and
productivity. While statistically  conservative,  this method avoids confounding the impact of
property rights per se with the effect of (time-invariant)  village and individual characteristics
that may be correlated with either property rights regime or land market participation
decisions. After first discussing the land rental decision,  this section will discuss the two
outcome equations (labor intensity and investment) of interest. Because the investment
variable is censored, standard fixed effect methods will not yield consistent results, and
simulated maximum likelihood  methods are instead developed.
2.1 Land Market Participation
Based on equation (5), the ith farm household's rental decision at time t will be based
on its potential autarchy marginal land productivity:
(16)  fit =Z1 Y+  [vi +afe 1 ],
where the determinants of land productivity,f,,  have been partitioned into observable
variables (endowments, etc.) Zit, a time invariant  latent variable (capturing household fanring
skill,  Ai, local soil quality, etc.) v,f{, and a random noise component, Cs  f Ei  with s{f - N(0,1).
Matching the theoretical discussion, the discrete rental regirne, Rf,,  is determined  by the
following ordered probit-like criteria function:
[rent-in  (R'  > 0,R° =0)  if fi, >rj, +c'(Mj,)
(17)  Rit =  autarchy (R',R°  =O) if rj, -c 0(Mj)<  fi, <rj, +c(Mj,)
(rent - out (R'  =  O,R° > 0) if  fit < rj, -c 0(Mj,)
where c(Mj,) = c' + clM1,  and co(Mf,)  = co + cfMjt  are respectively the rent-in and rent-out
transactions costs that are function of the property rights regime in villagej  at time t. Note
20that this specification  permits transaction costs to be asymmetric for landlords and tenants.
The latent variable v f is likely to confound consistent estimation of the parameters in
(17) for several reasons. First, household-specific  effects that influence land productivity  and
rental decisions, such as technical efficiency  in agricultural  production, are potentially related
to contract land endowments  and other measured variables. In addition, local village factors
such as soil productivity,  quota obligations and ideological climate are likely related to the
economically endogenous local property rights structure (Liu et al., 1998). Simnilar  biases will
infect the labor intensity and investment equations developed below. To control for these
factors, we follow the approach suggested by Mundlak (1978) and the latent effect as a linear
projection of the household's average of Zi,  in the two periods:
(18)  vi  =Zi.6f +Of  Uj
ilh  ~  ~  ~  i
where Z, is the  h  Zi, over the t time periods, and we assume that
it  ( ,1 . In other words, the Zi are used to instrument for the latent component (cite?).
Mundlak (1978) shows that for a standard linear (uncensored) equation, GLS estimation
under (18) reduces to a standard fixed effects estimator. While that will not be the case here,
as in the linear, fixed effects case, it will be impossible  to identify the impact of any Z 1t that do
not vary over time and as with a conventional fixed estimator,  the y will be identified  based on
within household variation. 16
Using (18) and (16), the sorting relationship (17) can be rewritten as:
16 Between  household  variation  is eschewed  because  under  (18) it is inextricably  correlated  with  the latent  time
invariant  factor.
21rent-in  if  E,f > b,
(17'  Rit =  autarchy if  ait < ,,f < bi,
rent-out  if  £ f  < ai,
where
bit =  If [rj, + c  (Mj, ) - (zitr +  Zi6f  +Of uif)];  and,
I  f 
a,  = -[rrt  - c  (M,)  - (Zi,y + Zif  +Of  ui
of
While the rental decision represented in (17') could be estimated separately as an
ordered probit model (with appropriate allowance made for the existence of the household
specific effect that render linear panel methods inconsistent), we will instead move toward a
full information specification that jointly estimates  the rental decision along with the labor
intensity and investment decisions.
2.2 Investment and Labor Allocation
The theoretical model in Section 1 identified distinct regimes and hypotheses for
investment and factor allocation based on the households participation in the rental market.
Econometrically  we specify the choice of labor intensity,  Wit, as:
X,a'  +vi  +Si,'  if R'>0;
(19)  ln(el)=  Xi,a  +t e +  ,E  if R 0,RI =0;.
X,a°  ++v,  +Si,  if R°  >0
The explanatory variables have been partitions as before. As with the rental decision, it is
likely that both property rights and endowment variables included in the X,  are correlated
with the time invariant factor, v,'.  We therefore express the latent, time invariant effect as
22Vi  X1 8  (0  i  uif  u'  N(0 1) and (eif sit')'  N(O,  If,) where
f  f  '
(20)  2
P 1tUr  Cat  at
The decision about desired or notional investment per-mu, k,  decision can be
represented as follows:
P  v  +E  if  >O
(21)  k  = X  P  v  +  R  ,R  =0
P  v  +E  if  >0;
with analogous assumptions made on the distributions of the latent and error components.
Desired investment is subject to Tobit-like censorship such that observable investment,  ki,,  is
determined  by the following rule:
(22)  k  k  if k,,  0
0, otherwise
The error specifications for (19) and (21) are fairly general as they permit the random
factor choice equations.  This specification accounts for selectivity-like bias that results from
both spontaneous
It is quite possible that the decisions of labor intensity and investment intensity are
correlated, making it desirable to estimate the full system defined by (17 ), and (19)-(22) via a
full information approach.  However, even under the simulation-based  methods to be
integration of trivariate normal distribution which, when added together with the requirements
23of the simulation  methods themselves, would make for a computationally  forbidding problem.
Instead, at some cost of efficiency,  we turn to the estimation of the two systems defined by
(17') and (19) and (17') and (21)-(22).
2.3 Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation Method
The two systems of equations of interest here unfortunately cannot be consistently
estimated using fixed-effect,  analysis of covariance estimators. Because the rental variable is a
qualitative, ordered probit analogue and because investment is censored, differencing
equations between time periods (e.g., k, 2- ku) will no longer sweep away the time invariant
latent component in either the rental or the investment equations (Hsiao, 1986). To get
around this problem, we follow Gourieroux and Monfort (1993) and adapt simulated
maximum likelihood  methods to our problem. While we do not observe the vector of errors
on the time invariant components for household i, ui = (uff  ,uk,u)',  we can simulate  using
Monte Carlo methods. For each simulated replication, h, we can write a likelihood function
conditional on uih.  In the case of the land rental-investment  system, there are 6 conditional
likelihood regimes defined by the combinations  of the 3 rental and the 2 investment censorship
regimes. Appendix 2 below derives expressions for these 6 likelihood regimes. Letting
LjR,  (4f,4Ek  I u j)  denote  the likelihood  for observation  ki,  in regime  R (R =1,6)  conditional  on
replication ujh,  we can write the conditional likelihood for household i as:
6
(23)  Lih  (Q2  I Uh)  =I7(  n  iLth(sE,k  I  Ui,
R=1  tik,,  3R
where Q2  is the full vector of parameters defined by (17) and (21) above. Mean simulated  log
likelihood for household i is then given by:
241H
(24)  Li(fQ  ) _ ln[ 1XLIh(Qk  l vi*)]
Hh=l
where His the number of replications  of the simulated error. Maximization of (24) summed
across households will yield consistent estimators of the parameters in the model above, and
will yield a good approximation of the true likelihood  even with a moderate H, as long as
different values of u 1 are drawn for each observation (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1993). In the
analysis that follows, His  set equal to 25.
In the case of the labor intensity decisions, there are only 3 regimes, as described in
Appendix 2.  The analogues to (23) and (24) for the labor-rental system of equations are
straightforward.
Section 3 Econometric Results
To estimate the models developed in the prior section, we turn to panel data derived
from two comprehensive  surveys administered in eight provinces of China in 1988 and 1993.17
The surveys  contained both a household and a village questionnaire.  Villages and households
were chosen from the Rural Survey Base maintained by the Rural Survey Team of the State
Statistical Bureau of China. The household questionnaire  asked questions ranging from land
rights, land transactions and annual agricultural production to off-farm employment. The
village questionnaire asked questions about land tenure arrangements at the village level both
in the surveyed years and in the history. In 1997, a supplementary  village survey was
17 The 1988 and 1993 surveys were designed by the Development Research Center under the State Council of
China, with the assistance of the Land Tenure Center at University of Wisconsin-Madison, and implemented
by the Rural Survey Team of the State Statistical Bureau. Both surveys covered the same 800 households in
Jilin, Henan, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang provinces. Both surveys were financed by the Ford Foundation.
25administered  to fill institutional data that was missing from the prior surveys.
3.1 Variable  Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
The current study draws on data from 3 of the 8 surveyed counties, Ning, Yueqin, and
Shaoxin, in Zhejiang province and two counties, Nancheng and Anfu, in Jiangxi province.
These counties were selected  for analysis because rice is the staple crop in all of them.
Complete data were available from both periods for 398 households in these rice producing
counties.
Table 1 presents descriptive  statistics for the key variables to be utilized in the
econometric analysis. The average labor intensity of rice production rose by about 30%
between the two survey periods. The intensity of investment (measured as the input of labor
time into construction of wells, irrigation and drainage ditches, ponds, application of organic
fertilizers, land flattening, soil improvement etc.) rose only slightly over the period, though as
the standard deviations show it became much more variable over time.
The impact of property rights upon these two key allocation variables is of course the
primary focus of this study. As described in Liu et al. (1998), distinct property rights regimes
have evolved at the local level in the nearly two decades since the creation (or at least formal
recognition) of the household responsibility system. To construct village and time specific
measures of transfer rights and tenure security,  the principle component method of factor
analysis was used to create a one dimensional  measure (a factor score) of both security and
transfer rights from sets of multiple indicator variables.' 8 The factor score variables are scaled
as standard normal variables, with higher values indicating greater security and less
26encumbered transfer rights, respectively.
For the land transfer variable, the available indicators concern the degree and extent of
restrictions on use rights transfers and restriction on land rental.  Since village collectives
formally own land, there cannot be individual land sales in China. However, in some
instances, fanners are entitled to sell their contractual use rights to the land allocated to them
under the household responsibility system (HRS). As shown in Table 2, land transfer rights
have on average become less restricted since 1998, with the average factor score rising to 0.4
from -0.4.
There are three indicators variables that signal the degree of tenure security enjoyed by
a household: Whether their land holding will be reduced if a household's population is
reduced; Whether their land holding will be increased if a household's population is increased;
and, The frequency of land adjustments (average number of adjustments per year) since the
establishment  of HRS in the village. The factor score for tenure security has actually
diminished over the 1999 to 1993 time period, reflecting in part the greater number of land
reallocations that had taken place by 1993 as compared to 1988. In addition, in 1993 more
villages reported that their rules stipulated  reallocations based on household demographic
changes.
Of the other variables needed for the analysis, one of the most problematic is the land
rental rate, rjt. Rental rate data were not recorded in the 1988 survey, and the analysis to
follows thus relies on time and county dummy variables as well as a measure of village land
scarcity (agricultural land per-capita) to control for differences in the rental rate.  As can be
seen in Table 2, land became slightly more scarce (relative to labor) over the period of the
la See  Liu et al. (1998)  for an in-depth  presentation  of the underlying  property  rights indicator  variables.
27panel.  Other things equal, we would expect this land scarcity variable to be inversely related
to the land rental rate.
Table 2 shows the other variables available for the analysis. The sample average off-
farm employment ratio (measured at the village level) rose from 34% to 38% over the
period.'9 Under the assumption  that households adaptively form their expectations about
future off-farm employment growth, this employment  ratio variable measures 4, the shifter of
the employment shock distribution. Variables used to measure household agricultural
productivity (and hence land and other factor demand in agriculture) are its endowment ratio 20
(contract land per-family member), household average years of formal schooling years,
average age of household members, number of parcels of household operational land, and the
percentage of contract land that is flat and therefore irrigable. Household average age is used
to capture the household's experience in agriculture,  though its effect could be mixed. For
while it could increase agricultural productivity,  it may also induce households to engage in
more non-farm activities and thus accumulate specific human capital accordingly (Yao,
1997).2' The number of parcels accounts for possible inefficiency  associated with land
fragmentation  that is widely observed in China as a result of egalitarian distribution of land.
3.2 Estimation Results
19 In defining  this variable,  an industrial  worker  is defined  as one  who worked  for more  than one third  of the
year in local  industry,  and a labor  is defined  as a man within  the age range of 16  to 60 and a woman 16  to 55.
20  Because  land  and labor  endowments  are theoretically  expected  to work in opposite  directions,  we combine
them into a single  ratio in an effort  to save  degrees  of freedom.
21In  our  reduced  form  context,  one  really can not predict the sign of any parameters. Here we only point out
those forces that we think might be the strongest.
28Table 1 above summarizes the key theoretical  propositions to be tested. As shown in
that table, both factor price equalization  and investment regret effects are hypothesized to
create linkages between endowments and factor use for autarchy households. Under the
proposed econometric model, we cannot separately identify these two effects for autarchy
households. However, as shown in table 1, endowment-dependent,  non-separable factor use
by households in the rent-in regime does uniquely identify an investment  regret effect.
Similarly, impacts of transfer rights on factor choice for autarchy households identifies a
regret, but not a factor price equalization  effect. Finally, the theoretical analysis suggests that
any impact of transfer rights on factor choice by rent-out households uniquely identifies  a
factor price equalization effect.
As discussed in Section 2, the econometric strategy employed here utilizes a fixed
effect analogue method to control for latent regional and household-specific components.
Given that this approach places an already heavy load on the data, we restrict the effect of the
other productivity control variables that influence land and factor productivity (see Table 2) to
be identical across the land market participation  regimes. Estimated values for these
coefficients are presented in Appendix 3. Not surprisingly given the panel estimation method,
these variables, most of which change relatively little over time, show little statistical
significance. Exceptions are the wage variable, which is highly significant and has the
expected negative sign in the labor intensity equation, and the variable measuring the number
of parcels. This latter variable has a negative sign, indicating that when a household has a
greater number of parcels, labor and investment decline. The nuisance parameters (the 6 that
29predict the latent effects) are not reported. 22 A number of them are significant,  meaning that
between-household  variation in the observed variables contains significant explanatory  power.
However, because this variation is perfectly collinear with the effects of the latent, time-
invariant factors, we eschew it completely from the analysis.
Table 3-the  structure of which parallels  that of Table 1-summarizes  the primary
findings concerning the effects of property rights. Somewhat surprisingly,  the coefficient on
the tenure security variable is small and statistically  insignificant. In contrast, fairly strong
statistical support emerges for the various transfer rights effects hypothesized above. First,
greater transfer rights do significantly  reduce the width of the autarchy regime via their impact
on the thresholds or boundary points that determine when a household shifts regimes.
Interestingly,  for both the labor intensity and investment equations, this threshold effect is
estimated to operate only on the boundary between autarchy and renting-out, whereas the
effect on the rent-in to autarchy boundary is statistically  insignificant. One explanation for this
asymmetry is that a rent-out household bears more risks than a rent-in household when
transfer rights are restricted. One such source of such differential risk is that renting out land
could be regarded as a sign of politically unacceptable  landlordist exploitation. Another
source of such risk is that renting out land signals land abundance for its owner, and could
expose the household to unfavorable land reallocation in the next period.
The separability or endowment dependence  tests confirm the predictions of the
theoretical model.  For rent-out households, it is impossible to reject the hypothesis that factor
choice is separable from the land-labor endowment ratio. For the other two regimes, there is
a significantly  negative effect of the endowment ratio on the intensity of both labor and
22 The full results are available from the authors.
30investment.  For autarchy households, this non-separability  results theoretically from both
regret and factor price equalization effects. For rent-in households, non-separability  uniquely
identifies an investment  regret effect. In addition to their relevance to the property rights
issues of interest here, these non-separability  results suggest that prior separability tests that
have globally tested for separability  by implicitly restricting  all households to belong to the
same regime may well have been mis-specified. An important exception to this pattern of
global separability  testing is the paper by Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin (1998), which,
like this one, finds that global separability restrictions are inappropriate. 23
In addition to their threshold effects, less restricted transfer rights are also predicted to
move factor choice in the rent-in and rent-out regimes closer together.  Here, however, the
econometric results do not conform to this theoretical expectation. Transfer rights have no
significant  effect on factor intensity in the rent-out regime, and the only significant  coefficient
(that linking investment intensity to transfer rights in the rent-in regime) has the opposite sign
of that predicted by the model. These effects, which are a big part of the factor price
equalization effect, thus appear to be quite weak.
In the absence of off-farm employment growth shocks, the theoretical analysis
indicated that factor choice in the autarchy regime should be independent of transfer rights. In
the presence of such shocks, that independence  breaks down. As can be seen in Table 3, we
estimate a weakly significant positive effect of less restricted transfer rights on investment and
labor intensity. Like the finding of non-separable factor choice in the rent-in regime, this
coefficient identifies the working of an investment  regret effect.
23  Unlike  the work  here,  the Sadoulet  et al. (1998)  paper  derives  distinct  separability  regimes  based  on labor
market,  not land  market  participation  decisions  under a theory  of labor  monitoring  and other  transactions
costs.
31Further evidence of significant investment  regret effects appears in the coefficients
relating factor choice to our regressive expectations-based  measure of future off-farm
employment growth. As predicted by the theory, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there
are no pure regret effects for households in the rent-out regime.  For the other two regimes,
the relevant coefficients are significant and negative as predicted in three of the four cases.
While these results are relatively strong, we did not find evidence of second order, regret
mitigation effects. As can be seen in Table 3, the coefficients  on the interaction between
transfer rights and endowments  and job shocks are insignificant for all three regimes, even
though the theoretical model predicts significant  regret mitigation (positive coefficients) for
the rent-in and autarchy regimes.
In summary,  the conservative estimation  technique employed here has found
substantial evidence concerning the impact of transfer rights upon investment and the
efficiency of resource allocation. Among those households that do not participate in the land
market, factor intensity and land productivity decline as contract land endowments increase,
signaling monitoring or other transactions costs in the labor market.  Less encumbered land
transfer rights shrinks the portion of the endowment space in which autarchy is the optimal
land market strategy, thereby moving the economy closer to full separability  in which shadow
factor prices are equalized across households. In addition, the econometric analysis uncovers
consistent evidence of the investment dampening regret effects that would be expected in a
rapidly industrializing  economy where land rental transactions were inhibited by significant
transactions costs. The ability of less encumbered transfer rights to mitigate those regret
effects has not, however, been firmly established empirically.
32Section 4  Conclusions and Policy Implications
While a number of studies have examined the economic effects of tenure security on
agricultural investment and productivity,  this paper has followed Besley (1995) and broadened
the scope of investigation to,  include the transferability,  as well as the security,  of household
residual income and use rights to land. The importance of transfer rights is likely to vary over
time.  When there is relatively little variation in factor endowment ratios across households (as
in rural China following the household responsibility system reform of circa 1980), then trade
restrictions should engender few costs. However, with industrialization, increasing
complexity and household economic specialization,  the potential for trade-and  the economic
costs of trade barriers-are  likely to rise.
Contemporary China offers an interesting  and important case to study the economic
impacts of transfer rights alongside the more conventional tenure security effects.
Industrialization  has spread rapidly, if unevenly,  across the country. Both over time and space
rural China also exhibits notable variation in both tenure security and transfer rights, opening
the way to the fuller investigation of the economics of property rights.
Using a theoretical model that presumes that agency costs block equalization of factor
productivities through labor market transactions, this paper derived a number of specific
hypotheses concerning the factor price equalization and investment regret mitigation effects of
land transfer rights. 24 Panel data on a sample of farm households, analyzed with simulated
maximum likelihood  methods, revealed a number of interesting,  occasionally surprising
24  It should  be stressed  that  because  it presumes  an egalitarian  economy  that is not marked  by the sorts  of
unequal  financial  market  access  that  create what Carter  and Zimmerman  call "countervailing  market  failures"
the model  here  may be a poor guide  to the impacts  of transfer  rights  in inegalitarian  economies.
33results:
.Consistent with the theory, separability  between factor intensity and household
endowments was rejected for rent-in and land market autarchic households and
accepted for rent-out households.  Such non-separability  signals the usual allocative
efficiency losses. The regime-specificity  of the separability results also cautions
against the global separability tests found in much of the peasant household literature.
* Via threshold effects, land transfer rights significantly  reduce the domain of non-
separable or endowment dependent factor allocation and thus enhance allocative
efficiency via a factor price equalization  effect.
* Consistent with the theory, rent-in and autarchic households exhibit a pure
investment  regret effect, with investment intensity declining as the proxy for expected
future off-farm employment growth increases.
* While theory predicts that transfer rights should mitigate these regret effects, no such
significant  effects were found.
e  Finally,  a conventional  tenure security variable fades into insignificance  when its
effects are simultaneously  estimated with those of the transfer rights variables.
While this latter and most surprising result may simply be an artifact of a data set
overburdened  with variation-sacrificing  panel methods and a complex regime switching
structure, it does suggest that caution be applied to studies that look at security dimension of
property rights in isolation from transfer rights. In an analysis of experimental  tenure security
reforms in a remote region of China, Kung (1999) suggests that the security-based investment
effects have been overstated in this region. Left open by Kung's analysis, however, is the
prospect that future industrialization  and non-agricultural growth in this region may open it to
the sort of investment regret and transfer effects explored here.
While it would be premature to issue policy proclamations based on the results
presented here, they remain suggestive. For in addition to underwriting the notion that
transfer rights may indeed emerge to be of dominant importance in an industrializing economy,
they also suggest possible novel property rights configurations. In particular, if the investment
34costs are modes for the sorts of periodic land redistributions that some authors have argued
form a rural safety net, then a property rights system with incomplete tenure security but with
strong transfer rights that permit specialization  without regret may have much to recommend
it.
35Table 1
Summary of Theoretical  Propositions*
Land Rental Regimes
Rent-In  Autarchy  Rent-Out
Tenure  Security Investment Demand Effect
ak/aS  +,  >04
Factor Price Equalization
Threshold Effects: aT'I /aM,  +  >04
aT,°/aM,  +  <04
Non-Separability/Endowment  Dependence:
a/aTc  ,ak/rTc  -0  < 0  =0
Transfer Rights  Dependence:  f/lM,1 , ak/dM,  <0  0  > 0
Investment Regret
Pure Regret: akIa  ,  aT/D  < 0  < 0  =0
Non-Separability: ak/DTc,a/aTc  <0  <0  =  0
Investment Regret Mitigation
Transfer Rights Dependence: aklaM 1 ,a  aM,  <0  0  =  0
ak/aTcaM,a/aTcaMM  > 0  >0  = 0
ak/laaa M , ,a/aaaM,  ,>0  >0  = 0
* Note that the shadow price of labor,  5, moves in the opposite direction of labor intensity,
while the  expected second period shadow value  of  investment, r2k, moves in  the sarne
direction as investment.
36Table 2
Descriptive Statistics from Panel of Rice-Producing Households
1988  1993
Factor Intensities
Labor Intensity  233  312
(labor hours/mu)  [114]  [154]
Investment  6.9  8.0
(labor hours/mu)  [16.6]  [34]
Property Rights
Transfer Rights Factor Score  -0.41  0.44
[1.0]  [1.0]
Tenure Security Factor Score  0.25  -0.44
[0.87]  [1.1]
Land Rental Rate
Village Land Scarcity  3.0  2.7
(mu per-capita)  [1.8]  [1.8]
Household Endowment Ratio  2.3  2.4
(mu-per  family member)  [1.7]  [2.1]
Off-Farm Employment Ratio  34%  38%
(village level)  [31]  [33]
Productivity Control Variables
Village Off-Farm  Wage Level  8.6  16.9
(Yuan/day)  [6.9]  [61]
Average  Age  32  34
[5.0]  [6.1]
Average Education  5.4  5.7
[1.6]  [1.5]
% Flat Land  9.8%  7.6%
[9.6]  [8.2]




Rent-In  Autarchy  Rent-Out
Investment Intensity, k
Tenure Security  Effect,  aklaS  -0.01
(0.02)
Transfer Rights Threshold Effects,  -0.06
aT1' am,  >,o;  (0.12)
a/lo /Ma  <o;  -0.59**
(0.16)
Non-Separability,  akl/ar  c  -0.06**  -0.03**  -0.02
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)
Transfer Rights Dependence: dk/aMl  0.42**  0.06*  0.14
(0.18)  (0.04)  (0.72)
Pure Regret: Dk/l  a  -0.6  -0.90**  1.89
(0.46)  (0.41)  (1.84)
Regret Mitigation  -0.01  -0.01  0.01
ak-larc'DMI  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)
akla4DMI  -0.27  0.001  -0.07
(0.24)  (0.08)  (0.92)
Labor Intensity, X
Transfer Rights Threshold Effects,  -0.03
aTll /am,  (0.12)
aI,°/aM,  -0.55**
(0.15)
Non-Separability, at/ar'  -0.06**  -0.03**  -0.4
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)
Transfer Rights Dependence: aJ/aMl  0.03  0.04  0.32
(0.15)  (0.03)  (0.51)
Pure Regret:  akla/4  -1.26**  -0.67*  1.89
(0.41)  (0.36)  (1.14)
Regret Mitigation  -0.002  -0.006  -0.02
akI/  caMc  (0.01)  (0.006)  (0.03)
akla4aM,  0.09  -0.02  -0.07
(0.21)  (0.07)  (0.65)
Standard deviations computed from the inverse of the Hessian are reported in the parentheses.
*Significant at the 10% significance level.
**  Significant at the 5% significance level.
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41Appendix 1: Second Period Household Production Problem
This appendix derives results used in the text concerning the second period shadow
value of first period investment in long-lived capital goods. In this appendix we ignore the
case in which a land reallocation shock occurs as it is obvious that in that case the second
period shadow value of first period investment is zero.
As described in the main body of the paper, we assume that all investment  is
undertaken in the first production period. In the second production period, households again
make labor allocation decisions and decide how much area to cultivate. Households that
invested in their rented land in the first period receive a rebate payment of vk  per-unit of
installed capital on the land they rented in.  Symmetrically,  landlord households pay out
rebates to first period renters who made investments in their contract land so that a
household's net rebate payment is Vk  (k,R'  - kto  R  ),  where kf° is the capital installed per-mu
on land rented out by the other party in the first period. We assume that a household expects
that Vk  will equal its use value of the investment (note 14 in the text discusses this assumption
in more detail). Land that is rented during the second period carries a surcharge based on the
amount of capital installed. The full second period rental price for improved land is (r,+ k2'
Vii),  where k2' is the amount of installed capital per-mu by the owner.
We  assume that the employment shock 0 is realized before the household makes its
second period production decisions. The household's second period problem thus appears as:
-E
Max  AiF(L2, K2,  T2f) +g(L  )+wL2 +  Vk(klRI -k°R 1
0)+
R2 , R  Ro  (r2' - co  (M 2 ) + vkkl  ) - R2 (r2  + c'  (M 2 ) +  Vkk2)
t2  a  2
S.t
K2 =K,  - R'k 1 +  Roko + R k'  - Rokc
(A  1.  1) -klc=  k(k,, k°o)
T2f =Tc  +R'  -R2°
L4+Ls2  L-L2
-E  -E
L2 =  Li  +0
Lf,Ls2,R,  R2°  20
where kic is the capital intensity on that portion of the household's contract land
endowment that it rents out in the second period. Note that kic would in general depend on
how intensively  the household invested in the land it cultivate (k); how intensively  its tenants
invested in the first period (kic ); and, on exactly which land the household chose to rent-out
in the second period. To reduce complexity  that adds no insight, we assume in the analysis
that follows that each household ex ante expects others in the village to have the samne  first
period investment intensity that it does so that kl,,  k1 0,  k2' and ki 1 are all the same. Under these
42assumptions and specification of the problem that guides optimal second period behavior, we
can derive the expected marginal  product of the first period investment K,, it
Al .1. Factor Price Equalization Effects without Employment Shocks
In order to isolate factor price equalization from regret effects, we first consider the
case of no employment shocks. Denote the value function of the problem in (Al. 1) by  7r2(..).
Recall that we define the expected second period value of investment as  r2  aE  - 2  . Using
the envelope theorem, this reduces to:
r2k  =  X2,  -+  ak  - + T  Evk +  - ak  EVk
= AFK(t2,k;)
where for notational simplicity  we have omitted the discount factor ,B. The last equality is
obtained by using the simplifying assumption  that EVK  is equal to the marginal product of
investment under own use.
To understand the factor equalization  effect in the first period, note that k2* is constant in
the second period as there is no added investment and a change in land holding does not
change the investment intensity. Therefore, the only way that  j 2k can change is through
changes in labor intensity. For reasons identical to those discussed in the text for first period
resource allocation, labor intensity in the second period does not depend on land endowment
for a household in either rent-in or rent-out regime, and decreases in land endowment for one
in autarky regime.  Therefore, under the assumption  that FLK>  0:
__2k  =  0,  for rent -in or rent -out regime
aTC  <0,  forautarky
Again for reasons identical to those discussed in the text for the first period problem, note that
labor intensity decreases, is constant, or increases in transfer rights Ml when a household is in
rent-in, autarky, or rent-out regime:
k  < 0, for rent -in regime
AaMl  = 0,  for autarky
> 0,  for rent -out regime
A1.2. Regret Effects in the Presence of Employment Growth Shocks
The impacts of off-farm employment growth shocks on the expected second period
43value of investment Sk  are most easily seen by separately analyzing  the first period land
market participation regimes.
Al.2. 1. Regret Effects  for Households that Rent-In Land in the First Period
For this case, a household expects to stay in the rent-in regime or move to the autarky
regime depending on the size the employment shock it receives. As developed in the text,
denote the critical shock value such that this switch place as Od, and recall that
(AU.3) - <°0  ao  >0.
The expected shadow price of first period investment for this case is:
(Al.4)  2k  =FK  (Wk 2)(0  ;  )dO  +FK  ,  e  (,Tc),  k2)0  (0;  )dO
where the superscript I denotes rent-in regime, and .e  is the optimal labor intensity for that
regime and is deternined by the following equation
(A.1.  5) FT (E', k2) =r2' + C'  (M2 ) + Vkk  I.
Comparing (AI.4) with (11) in the text, we have  eI*  = tA  (O,Tc),  so that
FK(,k)  = F(2(0  I, TC),k 2).
Using this result and integrating the second integral in (A1.4) by parts, we get
(A1.6)  rk  =F2A(,Tc)-f,fD(04)dFA(O,Tc)
Under the  stochastic  assumptions  made  in the text, note that  a(0;  o)a  <0 ,  and
dFK'(0,Tc) = (JFKA((O,Tc,)O)dO  <O. Using (12) in the text, the following results follow:
ar2k  a(;  A c
a  - D(O  a  ; dFK  (0,T c)< 0
ar  k  r-  >(  00;  dO  < O
a  =_a  (01  ;4 )dF;A(O ', Tc  )< O
aM 1 aM 2
44ar  = a9d' a@(°  6  °  dFK'(U',T'),  o 
a4Ml  aM 2 aI
r2  0  6  FK(  ,T ),o(I.,
JTCDM,  aM 2 DTC
A1.2.2. Regret Effects  for Households in First Period Autarky
As described in the text, that analysis for a household in first period autarky parallels
the case just analyzed for households that rent-in land. There is again a critical employment
shock,0°,  such that the household switches land market regime.  The value ofthis shock is
determined  by:
(A1.7)  FTA(e2A(O0o,Tc),k 2) = r2' -c(M 2)+vkklf
where the implicit function theorem shows:
(Al.8)  De  < 0  aM  <°
Integrating by parts and using the same assumptions as in the rent-in case, (15) in the text can
be rewritten as:
(Al.9)  r2  =  Fg  t  k  (04dR(;T)
yielding the following comparative  static results:
ar2k  _  ao (0;  A  c
__  h__  aJ 0 dFKA(O,Tc)< o
a-  =°R(0'  a  (0-;,)dO < 
aTc  °  Tc
ar2  =  - W  ,k  _  o<,  ;)FA(f  0,Tc)  <0
a~m,  aM 2 dM2
a27k  aJo0 A
aOMI  aM2  a4  dK  Jc  T)  > O
aFk2  abo  FA (60  ,Tc)(  ,4  O
WTCaM,  aM 2 aTC
45Note that sign of am, is indeterminate. Intuitively,  this indeterminacy  results from the fact
that while greater transfer rights increase the probability that a household will fall into the
rent-out regime and thus have to settle for the relatively low returns to capital it will receive
when it rents-out land. At the same time, however, returns improved transfer rights raise the
returns the household will receive in this case. While these effects are offsetting, we can say
that the positive effects will eventually dominate as either the stochastic structure shifts or as
contract land endowment increases. To see this, note that the second term in the expression
-k
for  decreases in 4, and for a given endowment. There will therefore exist a critical
aM,
value of 4, 4,  say, such that
k  <  <°,  if  <;
>  <0,  if  >
Similarly, for a given stochastic structure, there exists a critical endowment level such that
ar  becomes positive for endowments greater than that critical level. As shown in Figure 2,
am,
the impact of improved transfer rights is thus to rotate the relationship between shadow price
and contract land endowment.
A1.2.3. Regret Effects  for Households that Rent-Out Land in the First Period
As discussed in the text, there are no regret effects for households in this regime.
46Appendix 2: Conditional  Likelihood  Functions
There are six conditional  likelihood  regimes for the estimation of the investment
intensity, and three for labor intensity. This appendix derives  the
likelihood  function for the investment  regimes.  The regimes for the labor
intensity equation are essentially  the same as in cases (2),  (4), and (6)
below. Each of the likelihood  functions  shown here is conditional  on a
particular Monte Carolo replication  of uh  = (uf,  uk )'.  However,  to cut
down on clutter, the notation indicating this conditioning  has been
captured simply  as a subscript h on those terms that depend on the
simulated errors.
Regime 1: Rent-in, k = 0
jith = Pr(sgtR > bit,  k,* < 0)
(A2.1)  = J  bi,h  (  K
=  'D4(ki  -A,,h)  I/aK, -bith,  -PRK ]
where  p (.) stands for the joint distribution of c,,R  and EtKg  1 stands for the cdf of the standard
bivariate normal distribution,  and Ah  =  Xk [3  + Vihk.  The sit terms for this and the other
regimes are as defined in (+2') and (+6) of the text.
Regime 2: Rent-in, k > 0
Lath  =  (Sit,Rit  )deit
(A2.2)  =-(£i,  fK/)i  .C( 8 I CK)dER
1  1  kit - A;'h  )[  _ (bith  mC  )]
aK  UaK  c
where b stands for the pdf of the standard normal, and m,  i  %K  andaT= sqrt(ai2 _f3 2a?2),
with !,3  = pRKUR  IaK are the mean and standard deviation of the conditional distribution (Pc,
respectively.
Regime  3: Rent-out,  k = 0
47LV,.  = Pr(ER,  < ai,*ki, < 0)
(A2.3)  =  |kiRh  Jai,  ,,  (  )dEiR ditK
=  4D(kit -Ath  C)/  K  ai,h,PRK
where A0 = Xk  0 + Vjh
Regime 4: Rent-out, k > 0
LVih  =|  p(8iR,iK)dEtR
(A2.4)  =-  c(Ki/K)J_  o(Ei  R  £I  )di,R
aK. 
1  ¢(  it  t.h  4)(  ith  M 
CTK  aSK  a,
Regime  5: Autarky,  k = 0
L',,h  = Pr(a￿,  < Ei,R< bi, kit  < 0)
(A2.5)  = |  J  I(R  ,it  )ds1,Rds,
=  -D[(ki,  -Al*) /  agK,  bfh  ,  p3-cD[(kt,  - Ajth)  / (  K,  ait  p  RK
A Xik~~~ where Aith  Xp  +vik
Regime 6: Autarky, k > 0
L6=  Jb;  P( 8 l  Rit  )ditR
aith
(A2.6)  =  5b(g  /0K  )  ,Jt  (Sit Ri  )dEtR
aK~~~~~~~~~,
1  k-  )[(D  bith  -mC  )-_D(  a'ih  c 
(TK  6TK  ac  Tc4
48Appendix 3. Results of the Econometric Estimation'
Parameters  Investment Intensity  Labor Intensity
Rental  Investment  Rental  Labor
Decision  Equation  Decision  Equation
Village land endowment  -0.080  -0.086
(0.352)  (0.350)
Variables for transaction costs
Constant for rent-in  -0.426  -0.445
(0.894)  (0.880)
Transfer rights for rent-in  -0.063  -0.028
(threshold effect for rent-in)  (0.118)  (0.118)
constant for rent-out  5.086**  4.989**
(0.917)  (0.902)
Transfer rights for rent-out  -0.586**  -0.550**
(threshold effect for rent-out)  (0.158)  (0.154)
Shared Variables
Yeardummy(1993=  1)  -0.904**  0.064  -0.886**  0.129
(0.258)  (0.050)  (0.249)  (0.043)
Household land endowment  0.021  0.019
(0.047)  (0.047)
Average education  0.093  0.016  0.080  -0.001
(0.129)  (0.029)  (0.128)  (0.025)
Average age  0.002  0.001  0.008  0.001
(0.024)  (0.005)  (0.024)  (0.004)
Parcels of land  0.060**  -0.007**  0.606**  -0.012**
(0.020)  (0.003)  (0.203)  (0.003)
Ratio of flat land  0.028  0.006  0.061  -0.014
(0.191)  (0.044)  (0.198)  (0.041)
Village industrial wage  -0.228  0.045  -0.182  -0.152**
(0.195)  (0.052)  (0.191)  (0.044)
Ratio of village industrial  -3.110**  -3.127**  -0.016
labor  (1.468)  (1.446)  (0.021)
Tenure security  -0.105  -0.013  -0.144
(0.112)  (0.024)  (0.111)
Rent-in Regime
Constant  5.179**  5.998**
(0.330)  (0.272)
Transfer rights  0.416**  0.032
(0.176)  (0.154)
Household land endowment  -0.061**  -0.058**
(0.014)  (0.012)
Ratio of village industrial  -0.601  -1.263**
labor  (0.466)  (0.405)
Transfer rights x household  -0.012  -0.002
land endowment  (0.015)  (0.013)
49Transfer rights x ratio of  -0.273  0.098
village industrial labor  (0.243)  (0.217)
Village land endowment  0.162  -0.197**
(0.103)  (0.086)
Autarchy  Regime
Constant  5.798**  5.620**
(0.253)  (0.244)
Transfer rights  0.064*  0.044
(0.037)  (0.034)
Household land endowment  -0.032**  -0.032**
(0.012)  (0.010)
Ratio of village industrial  -0.901**  -0.672**
labor  (0.408)  (0.357)
Transfer rights x household  -0.007  -0.006
land endowment  (0.007)  (0.006)
Transfer rights x ratio of  0.001  -0.020
village industrial labor  (0.084)  (0.075)
Village land endowment  -0.044  -0.168**
(0.072)  (0.063)
Rent-out  Regime
Constant  2.845  2.981**
(1.794)  (1.178)
Transfer rights  0.150  0.323
(0.723)  (0.515)
Household land endowment  -0.023  -0.047
(0.047)  (0.038)
Ratio of village industrial  1.892  1.898
labor  (1.843)  (1.140)
Transfer rights x household  0.006  -0.023
land endowment  (0.033)  (0.028)
Transfer rights x ratio of  -0.068  -0.073
village industrial  (0.921)  (0.655)
labor
Village land endowment  0.466  0.194
(0.374)  (0.266)
1. The number of cases is 794, with equal number of cases for each of the two periods. Standard deviations
computed from the inverse of the Hessian are reported in the parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% significance level. **  Significant at the 5% significance level.
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